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Abstract
Antisocial punishment in public good games, i.e., punishment of individuals who
contributed the same or more than their punisher, varies substantially across cultures.
We exploit the data of Herrmann et al. (2008) and estimate a finite mixture model
to uncover the heterogeneity behind this variation in a parsimonious way. The finite
mixture model reveals that, overall, the population consists of two cleanly segregated
punisher types: 35.3% Type AF subjects who engage in antisocial punishment as well
as free rider punishment and 64.7% Type F subjects who engage exclusively in free rider
punishment. Moreover, we find that in cultures with high levels of antisocial punish-
ment, Type AF subjects are more frequent. Despite its parsimony, this classification of
subjects into types predicts mean earnings per group and enhances our understanding
of the large variation in the effectiveness of peer punishment across cultures.
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1 Introduction
Many social interactions can be described as a public goods game, where individuals re-
peatedly contribute at a personal cost to a joint project benefiting everyone in the group.
Examples comprise teamwork in firms, civic engagement in school boards or political parties,
and neighborhood associations. Repeated public goods games represent a social dilemma in
which individual rationality would call for free riding among selfish agents, while the joint
payoffs are maximized when all agents contribute fully. The vast literature on experimental
public goods games reliably shows that many subjects are willing to contribute initially, but
over time contributions decay to low levels (Ledyard, 1995). The reason for this decay is
that a majority of subjects can be characterized as conditional cooperators who are willing
to contribute if and only if others contribute as well (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Thöni
and Volk, 2018).
Peer punishment is a prominent mechanism to counter the decay of cooperation (Yamag-
ishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In public goods games with punish-
ment subjects have access to a punishment technology, enabling them to punish their peers
at a cost after observing their contributions. The early studies in this literature suggested
that peer punishment is often deterrent, i.e., sufficiently strong to enforce high contributions
from all subjects in the group (Chaudhuri, 2011).
However, subsequent research demonstrated that the beneficial effects of peer punishment
should not be taken for granted. One of the problems of the peer punishment mechanism
is that subjects might use it not only to punish low contributors. Gächter et al. (2005) in
a four country comparison and later Herrmann et al. (2008) in a larger sample document
substantial differences in the punishment strategies across subject pools. In particular, they
show large differences in the degree to which subjects engage in antisocial punishment, the
punishment of high contributors.1
Unsurprisingly, antisocial punishment is detrimental to the willingness to cooperate and
renders peer punishment largely ineffective. Gächter et al. (2010) analyze differences in
punishment behavior across cultures. While the level of free rider punishment is fairly similar
1Herrmann et al. (2008) define antisocial as punishment of subjects with a weakly higher contribution
than the punisher. Related studies use the term perverse punishment and define it as punishing above-
average contributors (Bochet et al., 2006; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006) or punishing the highest contributor
(Casari and Luini, 2009). See Fu and Putterman (2018) for a comparison of the different definitions.
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across subject pools, there is substantial cross-cultural variation in the level of antisocial
punishment, leading to substantial differences in the effectiveness of peer punishment.
Despite the central role of antisocial punishment for the success of peer punishment mech-
anisms, its cause and determinants are not well understood. Some argue that it is driven
by a competition for status (Sylwester et al., 2013), or a dislike of morally superior acts
(Monin, 2007). Experimental evidence suggests that descriptive norms may cause antisocial
punishment (Parks and Stone, 2010; Irwin and Horne, 2013). Theoretically, antisocial pun-
ishment could stem from inequality averse punishers, who want to avoid earning less than
non-punishing subjects (Thöni, 2014).
While the previous literature focused on the motives of antisocial punishment, our main
goal is to uncover the latent heterogeneity behind the cross-cultural variation in antisocial
punishment. In particular, we exploit the data of Herrmann et al. (2008) and estimate a finite
mixture model. The data comprises the behavior of 1,120 subjects across 16 subject pools
who played repeated four-person public good games with costly punishment. The subject
pools are highly diverse and originate form the English Speaking, Protestant European,
Southern European, Orthodox/Ex-Communist, Arabic Speaking, and Confucian cultural
areas.2
Estimating a finite mixture model allows us to take latent heterogeneity parsimoniously
into account. The finite mixture model assumes the population to consist of a finite number
of types that differ in their punishment behavior. It identifies the prevalent types in the
population and characterizes each of them by its relative size and type-specific parameter
estimates. Moreover, after identifying and characterizing the prevalent types, the finite
mixture model allows us to compute individual probabilities of type-membership and classify
each subject into the type that best fits her behavior. Overall, this yields a parsimonious
and easy to interpret characterization of the heterogeneity in punishment behavior.
A major advantage of our implementation of the finite mixture model is that we do not
need to predefine the distinct types ex-ante. They arise endogenously from the data and
capture the different punishment behaviors in a statistically efficient way. To determine the
optimal number of types, we estimate versions of the model with different numbers of types
and select the one that yields the cleanest classification of subjects into these types relative
2Our classification of subject pools into cultures is based on Gächter et al. (2010) and uses measures
of cultural proximity by Inglehart and Baker (2000) and more recent updates of the World Cultural Map
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).
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to its goodness of fit.
The results reveal that we can characterize the heterogeneity in punishment behavior
by two distinct types: Type AF and Type F subjects. Type AF subjects engage in both
antisocial and free rider punishment and make up 35.3% of the population. In contrast,
Type F subjects make up the remaining 64.7% of the population and exclusively engage in
free rider punishment.
The individual classification of subjects into the two types explains the two most im-
portant features of punishment behavior across the 16 subject pools. First, it explains the
substantial cross-cultural differences in antisocial punishment, because Type AF subjects are
substantially more frequent in subject pools with high levels of antisocial punishment. In
particular, they make up 44.3–59.0% in the Orthodox/Ex-Communist and Arabic speaking
subject pools which exhibit high levels of antisocial punishment. In contrast, Type AF sub-
jects only make up 17.7–22.2% of the Confucian, Protestant European, and English Speaking
subject pools where antisocial punishment is much rarer. Second, the classification of sub-
jects into types also explains why the level of free rider punishment remains fairly stable
across all subject pools. Since both Type AF and Type F subjects punish free riders to a
similar extent, free rider punishment remains stable even if the shares of the two types varies
across cultures.
Finally, the individual classification of subjects into types is also a powerful predictor for
the effectiveness of peer punishment. For instance, groups consisting exclusively of Type AF
subjects earn on average 41.2% less than groups consisting exclusively of Type F subjects.
Moreover, regressions reveal that the number of Type AF subjects per group explains 11.9%
of the total variation in earnings across groups—considerably more than both the current
period of the public good game and the same groups’ average contributions in a public good
game without punishment.
Our results shed new light on the discussion about self governance of cooperation. While
there is evidence that behavior in public goods games without punishment does not vary
substantially across cultures (Brandts et al., 2004), there are large and systematic differ-
ences in the experiment with punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008). The previous literature
attributed the differences to the overall prevalence of antisocial punishment in a subject pool,
but did not examine heterogeneity. Our results enhance this strand of the literature. They
show that the substantial cross-cultural variation in antisocial punishment can be explained
by a classification of subjects into two distinct types that is clean, parsimonious, and yet,
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powerful at predicting variations in the effectiveness of peer punishment.
Due to its parsimony and predictive power, our classification of subjects into types could
be used not only to inform the development of theoretical models that take behavioral
heterogeneity into account but also to predict the effectiveness of policies within firms and
societies that rely on peer punishment. Moreover, if the distribution of the two types across
cultures turns out to be stable over time, it may even explain some differences in economic
development. Societies with a high share of Type AF subjects may have to rely more on
formal punishment mechanisms, which require explicit rules that probably are more costly
and less flexible to implement.
More broadly, the paper also contributes to the literature that applies finite mixture
models to uncover distinct preference types. Early papers in this literature focused on
uncovering distinct behavioral strategies in the context of learning (El-Gamal and Grether,
1995) and complex dynamic decision making (Houser et al., 2004). Other studies used
finite mixture models to classify subjects into rational and behavioral types in the context
of decision making under risk (Bruhin et al., 2010; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010; Conte et al.,
2011; Santos-Pinto et al., 2015; Bruhin et al., 2019b). Finally, more closely related studies
applied finite mixture models to uncover distinct social preference types, mostly in dictator
and ultimatum games (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011, 2013; Breitmoser, 2013; Bruhin et al.,
2019a) as well as in fairness games (Conte and Moffatt, 2014). So far, only one study used
finite mixture models to analyze heterogeneous contributions in public good games (Conte
and Levati, 2014). They analyze behavior in a series of one-shot public good games without
punishment to classify subjects into three predefined types: egoists, conditional cooperators,
and unconditional cooperators. Our study adds to this literature by classifying subjects into
two distinct punishment types that arise endogenously in repeated public good games and
predict differences in the effectiveness of peer punishment.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 discusses the data and presents some
descriptive statistics about the subjects and their punishment behavior. Section 3 presents
the finite mixture model for uncovering the latent heterogeneity in antisocial punishment
and classifying subjects into types. Section 4 presents the main results, the predictions
regarding the effectiveness of peer punishment, and some robustness checks. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
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Figure 1: Geographical Location of the 16 Subject Pools
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This section first summarizes the repeated public good games from Herrmann et al. (2008)
and describes the 16 different subject pools. Subsequently, it presents descriptive statistics
on the subjects and their punishment behavior.
2.1 Data
Herrmann et al. (2008) report data from repeated public good games with and without pun-
ishment. Both games are played over ten periods in groups of four and a partner matching.
Subjects are endowed with 20 tokens and the marginal per capita return is 0.4, i.e., each
token contributed to the public good yields a return of 0.4 tokens for every member of the
group.
Subjects usually first played the game without punishment, followed by the game with
punishment. The games with punishment feature a 1:3 punishment technology. After ob-
serving all group members’ contributions in a given round, each subject decides how many
tokens to spend on punishing one or more of her peers. Every token spent on punishment
5
Table 1: Categorization of subject pools into cultural areas and number of subjects
Subject pool Country Culture #subjects
Boston USA English Speaking 56
Nottingham UK 56
Melbourne Australia 40
Copenhagen Denmark Protestant Europe 68
Bonn Germany 60
Zurich Switzerland 92
St. Gallen Switzerland 96
Minsk Belarus Orthodox/Ex-communist 68
Dnipropetrovs’k Ukraine 44
Samara Russia 152
Athens Greece Southern Europe 44
Istanbul Turkey 64
Riyadh Saudi Arabia Arabic Speaking 48
Muscat Oman 52
Seoul South Korea Confucian 84
Chengdu China 96
reduces the peer’s payoff by 3 tokens, while costing one unit to the punisher. We focus
our analysis primarily on the punishment behavior in the public good game with punish-
ment. However, in Section 4.4, we also use contributions in the public good game without
punishment to predict the groups’ earnings in the public good game with punishment.
Herrmann et al. (2008) feature data from 1,120 subjects from 16 culturally diverse subject
pools. Figure 1 shows the location of these subject pools on a world map. In all locations
subject pools are convenience samples (university students). We follow Gächter et al. (2010)
and use measures of cultural proximity to categorize the subject pools into six cultural
areas: English Speaking, Protestant Europe, Orthodox/Ex-Communist, Southern Europe,
Arabic Speaking, and Confucian. Table 1 shows the categorization along with the number
of subjects per subject pool.
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Figure 2: Summary of Punishment Behavior across Subject Pools
cooperation to achieve socially beneficial out-
comes in the presence of free-rider incentives. Ex-
amples abound: warfare, cooperative hunting,
voting, paying taxes, fighting corruption, contrib-
uting to public goods, teamwork, work morale,
neighborhood watch, common pool resource man-
agement, recycling, tackling climate change, and
so on. These are frequent situations with the com-
mon feature that cooperation leads to a group-
beneficial outcome but is jeopardized by selfish
incentives to ride free on others’ contributions.
To implement a cooperation game with and
without punishment opportunities, we adapted a
design developed by (1). In each participant pool,
we conducted the exact same public goods exper-
iment with real monetary stakes and two treat-
ment conditions: a no-punishment condition (the
N experiment) and a punishment condition (the P
experiment). Groups of four members played the
following public goods game in both conditions:
Each member received an endowment of 20 to-
kens. Participants had to decide how many tokens
to keep for themselves and howmany to contribute
to a group project. Each of the four group mem-
bers earned 0.4 tokens for each token invested in
the project, regardless of whether he or she con-
tributed any. Because the cost of contributing one
token in the project was exactly one token whereas
the return on that token was only 0.4 tokens,
keeping all one’s own tokens was always in any
participant's material self-interest, irrespective of
how much the other three group members con-
tributed. Yet, if each group member retained all
of his or her tokens, there were no earnings to be
shared; on the other hand, each member would
earn 0.4 × 80 = 32 tokens if each of them invested
their entire 20-token endowment.
All the interactions in the experiment were
computer-mediated (17) and took place anony-
mously. Participants were not informed about the
identity of others in the group; they made their
contribution decisions simultaneously, and, once
the decisions were made, they were informed
about the other group members' contributions.
The only and crucial difference between the P
experiment and the N experiment was that
participants in the P experiment could punish
each of the other group members after they were
informed about the others’ investments, whereas
the N experiment ended after participants were
informed about the other group members' con-
tributions. A punishment decision was imple-
mented by assigning the punished member
between zero and 10 deduction points. Each
deduction point assigned reduced the punished
member’s earnings by three tokens and cost the
punishing member one token. All punishment
decisions weremade simultaneously. Participants
were not informed about who punished them.
One of the goals of our experiment was to see
whether and at what level punishment stabilized
cooperation in the P experiment compared to the
N experiment. To allow for the emergence of dif-
ferent cooperation levels, we therefore repeated
the experiment 10 times under both conditions,
keeping the group composition constant.
Because we were interested in whether peo-
ple behave differently under the exact same cir-
cumstances, some methodological challenges
arose. First, with regard to procedures, we fol-
lowed the rules established in experimental eco-
nomics (13). A second challenge was maximizing
participant pool comparability to avoid con-
founds of participant pool differences with var-
iations in sociodemographic composition. To
minimize sociodemographic variability, we con-
ducted all experiments with university under-
graduates (n = 1120) who were similar in age,
shared an (upper) middle class background, and
usually did not know each other. We adminis-
tered a postexperimental questionnaire to be able
to control for further sociodemographic back-
ground characteristics (see table S2 for details).
Results. We first analyze people’s punish-
ment behavior across participant pools. Our
perspective is how an individual who has con-
tributed a certain amount to the public good
punishes other group members who contributed
either less, the same amount, or more than them.
Figure 1 therefore displays punishment expendi-
tures as a function of how much the punished
individual's contribution deviated from the con-
tribution of the punisher. We label the punish-
ment of negative deviations punishment of free
riding because the punished group member rode
free on the punisher’s contribution. Put differently,
from the perspective of the punisher the target
member behaved less prosocially than the pun-
isher. In case the target member contributed the
same amount or more, he or she behaved at least as
prosocially as the punisher. We therefore call the
punishment in these cases antisocial punishment.
Punishment behavior differed strongly across
participant pools (Fig. 1). This holds in particular
for antisocial punishment. A regression analysis
of punishment behavior, which controls for the
deviation, period effects, and sociodemographic
composition, shows that antisocial punishment
differed highly and significantly across partici-
pant pools [c2(14) = 64.9, P = 0.000; tables S3
and S4]. Although there was very little antisocial
punishment in some participant pools, in others
people punished those who contributed the same
or more than them as harshly as those who rode
free on them. By contrast, punishment of free
riding was only weakly significantly different
across participant pools [c2(14) = 23.1, P =
0.059; tables S3 and S4].
The punishment of free riding is likely trig-
gered by negative emotions that arise from a vio-
lation of fairness norms and from feeling exploited
(1, 2, 18). But what explains antisocial punish-
ment? One plausible reason is that people might
not accept punishment and therefore seek revenge
(8–10). Revenge is a “human universal” (19) and
part of a culture of honor in many societies. Our
measure for vengeful punishment is the punish-
ment people mete out as a function of received
punishment in the previous period. Controlling
for contributions of the punisher and the punished
participant, we find a highly significant increase in
antisocial punishment across all participant pools
as a function of the amount of punishment received
Fig. 1. Mean punish-
ment expenditures for a
given deviation from the
punisher’s contribution.
The deviations of the
punished participant’s
contribution from the
punisher’s contribution
are grouped into five in-
tervals, where [–20, –11]
indicates that the pun-
ished participant contrib-
uted between 11 and 20
tokens less than the pun-
ishing participant, [–10,
–1] indicates that the
punished participant con-
tributed between 1 and
10 tokens less than the
punishing participant, [0]
indicates that the pun-
ished participant con-
tributed exactly the same
amount as the punishing
participant, [1, 10] indi-
cates that the punished participant contributed between 1 and 10 tokens more than the punishing
participant, and [11, 20] indicates that the punished participant contributed between 11 and 20 tokens more
than the punishing participant. In Boston, for example, participants (including nonpunishers) expended 0.96
money units on average for all cases of negative deviations between [–10, –1] and 2.74 money units on
average in cases of deviations between [–20, –11]. Participant pools are sorted according to their mean
antisocial punishment. Fig. S2 and tables S3 and S4 provide complementary analyses.
Punishment of free riding
(negative deviations)
Anti-social punishment
(non-negative deviations)
5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
Mean punishment expenditures
Muscat
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[-10,-1]
[0]
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[11,20]
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Source: Herrmann et al. (2008)
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2 stems from Herrmann et al. (2008) and summarizes the subjects’ punishment be-
havior in each subject pool. It shows how the mean punishment expenditures depend on the
difference between the punished subject’s and her punisher’s contribution. The right panel
exhibits the mean expenditures on antisocial punishment, i.e., punishment of subjects who
contributed at least as much as their punisher. The left panel exhibits the mean expendi-
tures on free rider punishment, i.e., punishment of subjects who contributed less than their
punisher.
The figure reveals a key pattern in the subjects’ punishment behavior that motivates
this paper: on the one hand, there is substantial variation across subject pools in antisocial
punishment, on the other hand, free rider punishment is remarkably similar. For instance,
subjects who contribute more than their punishers receive almost no punishments in Boston,
Melbourne, and Nottingham but get heavily punished in Riyadh, Athens, and Muscat. In
contrast, (relative) free riders are heavily punished across all subject pools. Our goal is to
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analyze whether this pattern is the result of latent heterogeneity in the subjects’ punishment
behavior and whether uncovering this latent heterogeneity can predict differences in the
effectiveness of peer punishment.
3 Finite Mixture Model
This section presents the specification of the finite mixture model which allows us to uncover
latent heterogeneity in the subjects’ punishment behavior in a parsimonious way. It also
explains how we classify subjects into types and how we determine the optimal number of
types.
3.1 Specification
The finite mixture model assumes that the population consists of K types of subjects who
distinctly differ in their inclination to punish their peers. It uses a Tobit-specification where
the dependent variable is subject i’s non-negative expenditure for punishing her peer j in
period t: Pijt = max(P ∗ijt, 0).3 The unit of observation is a single punishment decision. As
there are three peers and ten periods we observe 30 punishment decisions per subject. The
latent type-specific inclination to punish is
P ∗ijt = β0 + β1k(cjt − cit) + β2(cjt − cit)I(cjt − cit < 0) + γXit + it , (1)
where, β1k represents subject i’s inclination to engage in antisocial punishment when she
belongs to type k, i.e., her inclination to punish the peer j in case the peer’s contribution,
cjt, is at least as high as her own contribution, cit. Similarly, −(β1k + β2) is i’s type-specific
inclination to engage in free rider punishment, i.e., her inclination to punish the peer j in
case the peer’s contribution falls short of her own contribution. γ measures the effects of
a vector Xit comprising the following control variables: i’s contribution in period t, the
average contribution of the other two peers in the group in t, the punishment she received
in the previous period t − 1, as well as the current period t and an indicator for the final
period. it is a normally distributed error term with variance σ2. To guarantee that the finite
mixture model discriminates the types according to their inclination to engage in antisocial
3We ignore that Pijt is also censored from above, since only in 1% of all punishment decisions subjects
choose to punish maximally.
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punishment, and not according to some other dimension, only the parameter β1k is type-
specific. All other parameters are common across the K types.
This specification implies that subject i’s type-specific contribution to the finite mixture
model’s density over all 30 punishment decisions, Di, is
f(Di;ψk, σ) =
10∏
t=1
3∏
j=1
[
1
σ
φ
(
Pijt − Pˆ ∗ijt(ψk)
σ
)]I(Pijt≥0) [
1− Φ
(
Pˆ ∗ijt(ψk)
σ
)]1−I(Pijt≥0)
,
where ψk = (β0, β1k, β2, γ) is the type-specific parameter vector which determines the pre-
dicted inclination to punish, Pˆ ∗ijt(ψk). φ represents the PDF and Φ the CDF of the standard
normal distribution.
We do not directly observe to which of the K types subject i belongs. Thus, we have to
weight her type-specific density contributions by the corresponding ex-ante probabilities of
type-membership, pik, to obtain her likelihood contribution to the finite mixture model,
`(Ψ;Di) =
K∑
k=1
pik f(Di;ψk, σ) ,
where the vector Ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψK , σ, pi1, . . . , piK−1) comprises all parameters that need to be
estimated, and piK = 1−
∑K−1
k=1 pik. Note that the ex-ante probabilities of type-membership
are the same across all subjects and correspond to the shares of the types among the popu-
lation.4
3.2 Classification of Subjects into Types
Once we estimated the parameters of the finite mixture model, we can classify each sub-
ject into the type she most likely belongs to, given her punishment behavior, Di, and the
estimated parameters, Ψˆ. To do so, we apply Bayes’ rule and obtain subject i’s individual
ex-post probabilities of type-membership,
τik =
pˆik f(Di; ψˆk, σˆ)∑K
m=1 pˆim f(Di; ψˆm, σˆ)
. (2)
4Since i’s likelihood contribution is highly non-linear, we apply the expectation maximization (EM)
algorithm to obtain the model’s maximum likelihood estimates (Dempster et al., 1977). The EM algorithm
proceeds iteratively in two steps: In the E-step, it computes the individual ex-post probabilities of type-
membership given the actual fit of the model (see equation 2). In the subsequent M-step, it updates the fit
of the model by using the previously computed ex-post probabilities to maximize each types’ log likelihood
contribution separately.
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Subsequently, we classify the subject into the type with the highest ex-post probability of
type-membership.
3.3 Determining Optimal Number of Types
The individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership also help us to find the optimal
number of types, K∗, that represent the best compromise between the model’s flexibility to
capture behavioral heterogeneity and its parsimony.
On the one hand, if K is too small, the model lacks the flexibility to cope with the
heterogeneity in the data and may disregard minority types. If K is too large, on the
other hand, the model is overspecified and tries to capture types that do not exist. Such
an overspecified model results in considerable overlap between the estimated types and an
ambiguous classification of subjects. Thus, we select the optimal number of types, K∗, such
that it provides the model with a good fit to the data and, at the same time, also yields an
unambiguous classification of subjects.
We apply the normalized entropy criterion (NEC) to summarize the ambiguity in the
individual classification of subjects into preference types (Celeux and Soromenho, 1996;
Biernacki et al., 1999). The NEC allows us to select the finite mixture model with K > 1
types that yields the cleanest possible classification of subjects into types relative to its fit.
The NEC for K preference types,
NEC(K) =
E(K)
L(K)− L(1) ,
uses the entropy,
E(K) = −
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
τik ln τik ≥ 0 ,
normalized by the difference in the log likelihood between the finite mixture model with
K types, L(K), and a model with just one type, L(1). The entropy, E(K), quantifies the
ambiguity in the ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τik. If all τik are either close to
one or close to zero, implying that each subject is classified unambiguously into exactly one
type, E(K) is close to zero. However, if many τik are close to 1/K, implying that many
subjects cannot be cleanly assigned to one type, E(K) is large.
One disadvantage of the NEC is that it is not defined in case of K = 1. Hence, we cannot
apply the NEC to decide whether estimating a finite mixture model is meaningful in the first
place or whether we should instead estimate a representative agent model with just one type.
10
Figure 3: Clean Classification of Subjects into K∗ = 2 Types
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The figure shows the distribution of the individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership τik (see equation
(2)) for the finite mixture model with K∗ = 2 types. Most subjects’ τik are either close to 1 or 0, indicating
that most subjects are cleanly classified into one of the two types. Thus, the two types are distinct and
exhibit only minor overlap.
However, to make that decision, we analyze whether the classification we derive from the
finite mixture model with the optimal number of types successfully predicts differences in
the effectiveness of peer punishment in Section 4.4.
4 Results
We start by discussing the finite mixture model’s optimal number of types and estimated
parameters. Subsequently, we analyze the distribution of types across subject pools and cul-
tures and assess how well the classification of subjects predicts differences in the effectiveness
of peer punishment. Finally, we present three robustness checks.
4.1 Optimal Number of Types
To determine the optimal number of types, K∗, we estimate the finite mixture model with
K = 2 and K = 3 types and analyze how cleanly subjects are classified into these types.
The model with K = 2 types yields a clean classification of subjects into types. Fig-
ure 3 shows the corresponding distribution of the individual ex-post probabilities of type-
membership, τik. The figure reveals that the finite mixture model classifies most subjects
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unambiguously into one of the two types with the corresponding τik lying in the vicin-
ity of one. Thus, the two types types are distinct and exhibit only minor overlap. The
normalized entropy criterion confirms that the classification of subjects into types is clean
(NEC = 0.363).
In contrast, the model with K = 3 types yields a substantially more ambiguous classifi-
cation of subjects into types. Figure A1 in Appendix A.1 shows that the individual ex-post
probabilities of type-membership are ambiguous for a large number of subjects, particularly
in the third type. This ambiguity indicates that there is substantial overlap between the
three types and the model may overfit the data. The NEC = 0.536 confirms this higher de-
gree of ambiguity. Thus, we conclude that the model with K∗ = 2 types represents the best
compromise between parsimony and flexibility. Moreover, we will show in Section 4.4, that
the parsimonious classification of subjects into types predicts differences in the effectiveness
of peer punishment and, thus, also outperforms a representative agent model with just one
type.
4.2 Estimated Parameters
Table 2 exhibits the estimated parameters of the finite mixture model with K∗ = 2 types.
The finite mixture model uses the Tobit-specification discussed in equation (1) where the
dependent variable is subject i’s expenditure to punish her peer j in period t.5
Type AF subjects make up 35.3% of the population and engage in antisocial punishment
as well as in free rider punishment. Their estimated inclination to engage in antisocial
punishment, βˆ1k, is positive. That is, when a peer at least matches their own contribution,
Type AF subjects punish the peer for an attempt to contribute even more. At the same time
their estimated inclination to engage in free rider punishment, −(βˆ1k + βˆ2), is also positive.
That is, when the peer’s contribution falls short of their own, Type AF subjects punish the
peer for an attempt to contribute even less.
Type F subjects, on the other hand, make up 64.7% of the population and engage ex-
clusively in free rider punishment. As their estimated inclination to engage in antisocial
punishment is negative while the one to engage in free rider punishment is positive, Type F
subjects tend to increase their punishment whenever a peer attempts to reduce his contri-
5Note that the signs and the significance levels of the parameter estimates have a direct interpretation.
However, due to the Tobit-specification, the size of their marginal effects on Pijt is non-linear.
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Table 2: Estimates of the Finite Mixture Model
Dependent variable[a]: i’s expenditure to punish j in period t Type AF Type F
Type-specific estimates
Share among the population (pik)[b] 0.353∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗
(0.041)∗∗∗ (0.041)∗∗∗
Inclination to antisocial punishment (β1k) 0.116∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
Inclination to free rider punishment −(β1k + β2)[c] 0.201∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗
(0.035)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗
Common estimates
i’s contribution (γ1) -0.201∗∗∗
(0.016)∗∗∗
Mean contribution other two group members (γ2) 0.062∗∗∗
(0.015)∗∗∗
Received punishment in t− 1 (γ3) 0.214∗∗∗
(0.022)∗∗∗
Period (γ4) -0.111∗∗∗
(0.018)∗∗∗
Final period (γ5) 0.601∗∗∗
(0.168)∗∗∗
Constant (β0) -1.958∗∗∗
(0.240)∗∗∗
Standard deviation of error term (σ) 3.661∗∗∗
(0.141)∗∗∗
Number of subjects 1,120∗∗∗
Number of observations 33,600∗∗∗
Log likelihood -28,108.47∗∗∗
AIC 56,238.94∗∗∗
BIC 56,331.59∗∗∗
Individual-specific cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
[a]
Since the dependent variable is non-negative, we use the Tobit specification shown in equation (1).
[b]
There are no significance stars as relative sizes lie within the interval [0, 1].
[c]
Estimates and standard errors are based on the Delta-method.
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bution.
The parameter estimates common to both types suggest that subjects tend to punish
less when they already spent a lot on their own contribution and more when the mean
contribution of the other group members is higher. There is also some evidence for revenge,
as subjects who got punished in the previous period tend to punish in the current period.
Finally, expenditures on punishment decline over time but shoot up again in the final period.
4.3 Distribution of Types across Subject Pools and Cultures
In this section, we analyze how the two types of subjects are distributed across subject pools
and cultures. To do so, we use the individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τik,
to classify each subject into the type best describing her behavior. Subsequently, we analyze
how the share of Type AF subjects among the population differs across subject pools and
cultures.
Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the share of type AF subjects across the 16 subject pools
along with the mean expenditure on antisocial punishment. The figure reveals that Type
AF subjects make up a substantially higher share of the population in subject pools that
exhibit a high mean expenditure on antisocial punishment. For instance, they make up more
than 50% of the population in Muscat and Riyadh but less than 20% in Nottingham and
Copenhagen.
Similarly, Panel (b) of Figure 4 shows the distribution of type AF subjects across the six
cultures. Again, Type AF subjects make up a much higher share in cultures with a high
mean expenditure on antisocial punishment. In particular, they constitute 44.3–59.0% of the
population in the Orthodox/Ex-Communist and Arabic Speaking subject pools which exhibit
high mean expenditures on antisocial punishment. In contrast, Type AF subjects only
make up 17.7–22.2% of the population in the Confucian, Protestant European, and English
Speaking subject pools where mean expenditures on antisocial punishment are substantially
lower. The only exception is the Southern European subject pool, where Type AF subjects
only make up 24.1% of the population but the mean expenditure on antisocial punishment
is the second highest across all cultures.
Overall, the distribution of types across subject pools and cultures explains the key
pattern in the subjects’ punishment behavior (see Figure 2). On the one hand, there is
substantial variation in antisocial punishment across subject pools, because the share of Type
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Figure 4: Share of Type AF Subjects and Mean Expenditure on Antisocial Punishment
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AF subjects tends to be higher in subject pools with a high mean expenditure on antisocial
punishment. On the other hand, free rider punishment is remarkably stable, because both
Type AF and Type F subjects punish free riders and, hence, differences in their share among
the population matter much less for the mean expenditure on free rider punishment.
4.4 Predicting the Effectiveness of Peer Punishment
In a next step we assess the power of the subjects’ classification into types to predict the
effectiveness of peer punishment. Ideally, the parsimonious classification we obtain from the
finite mixture model not only describes the key pattern in punishment behavior but also
predicts the implications of this behavior for the effectiveness of peer punishment.
If the classification of subjects into types predicts the effectiveness of peer punishment,
we expect groups with a high number of Type AF subjects to earn less on average. Since the
Type AF subjects engage in antisocial punishment, they (i) directly reduce their own and
their peers’ earnings and (ii) undermine their peers’ willingness to make high contributions.
These two effects should dampen average earnings in groups with many Type AF subjects.
Figure 5 reveals that, in fact, there is a negative relationship between a group’s mean
earnings and its number of Type AF subjects. In particular, average earnings per subject
are 15.00 tokens in groups with four Type AF subjects vs. 25.49 tokens in groups with no
Type AF subjects. Thus, groups consisting exclusively of Type AF subjects earn on average
41.2% less than groups consisting exclusively of Type F subjects.6
Next, we examine how well the classification of subjects into types predicts differences in
earnings relative to other variables. To do so, we estimate a linear regression model in which
we explain a groups earnings in each period by adding the following explanatory variables:
(i) the current period and an indicator for the final period, (ii) the group’s mean earnings
in the public good game without punishment during the corresponding period, and (iii) the
number of Type AF subjects in the group.
Table 3 shows the results. The first column reveals that the current period and the indi-
cator for the final period explain a mere R2 = 3.1% of the total variance in mean earnings.
The second column shows that, when we add the group’s mean earnings in the public good
6Figure A2 in Appendix A.2 shows how the number of Type AF subjects in the group is related to
mean expenditures on punishment (Panel a) and to mean contributions (Panel b). It confirms that a higher
number of Type AF subjects in the group reduces mean earnings not only directly via higher punishments
but also indirectly via lower mean contributions.
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Figure 5: Mean Earnings by Number of Type AF Subjects in Group
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Table 3: Regressions to Assess Predictive Power
Dependent variable: mean earnings in group g in t (1)∗∗∗ (2)∗∗∗ (3)∗∗∗
Period t 0.662∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
(0.064)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗
Indicator for final period -4.411∗∗∗ -3.718∗∗∗ -3.632∗∗∗
(0.551)∗∗∗ (0.580)∗∗∗ (0.578)∗∗∗
Mean Earnings in t in public good game 0.551∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
without punishment (0.126)∗∗∗ (0.111)∗∗∗
Number of Type AF subjects in group -3.150∗∗∗
(0.389)∗∗∗
Constant 18.170∗∗∗ 3.180∗∗∗ 5.112∗∗∗
(0.570)∗∗∗ (3.424)∗∗∗ (3.093)∗∗∗
R2 0.031∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
Number of groups 269∗∗∗ 269∗∗∗ 269∗∗∗
Number of observations 2,690∗∗∗ 2,690∗∗∗ 2,690∗∗∗
Group-specific cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
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game without punishment during the current period as an additional explanatory variable,
the R2 raises slightly by 3.2 percentage points to 6.3%. However, the third column reveals
that, when we add the number of Type AF subjects in the group as another explanatory
variable, the R2 almost triples to 18.1%. This jump in the fraction of the explained vari-
ance confirms that the finite mixture model’s parsimonious classification of subjects into
types exhibits substantial predictive power and explains 11.9% of the total variance in mean
earnings—way more than any of the other explanatory variables.
4.5 Robustness Checks
After discussing the main results and showing that the finite mixture model’s parsimonious
classification of subjects into types predicts differences in the effectiveness of peer punish-
ment, we now present robustness checks to address three important concerns.
4.5.1 Stability of Types
First, we assess whether the classification of subjects into types is stable over the course of the
experiment. This is an important question for two reasons. First, only if the classification is
stable, it can be used for making behavioral predictions in other contexts. Second, analyzing
the stability of the classification also sheds light on whether or not subjects learn and adapt
their punishment behavior over the course of the experiment.
To assess the stability of the classification of subjects into types, we re-estimate the finite
mixture model with a modified unit of classification. Instead of forcing the model to classify
all observations of a subject into the same type, we allow it to classify the observations of the
first five periods into a different type than the observations of the final five periods. Thus,
every subject features two ex-post probabilities of type-membership, one for the first five
periods and one for the final five periods.
The transition matrix below reveals how many subjects remain classified into the same
type over the course of the experiment and how many switch types.
Type-membership
in periods 6-10
Type F Type AF
Type-membership Type F 701 105
in periods 1-5 Type AF 161 153
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Overall, the classification of subjects into types remains fairly stable: 854 subjects, making
up 76.3% of the population, are on the main diagonal and, thus, remain in the same type over
the course of the experiment. Moreover, a χ2-test of independence rejects the null hypothesis
that type-membership in the first five periods is independent of type-membership in the final
five periods (p-value < 0.001). Hence, we conclude that the classification of subjects into
types is mostly stable and that there is no evidence of subjects learning and adapting their
behavior.7
4.5.2 Flexibility of Specification
Next, we address the concern that the specification of the finite mixture model may be
too rigid. Since it only allows for type-specific heterogeneity in the inclination to engage
in antisocial punishment, β1k, potential heterogeneity in other dimensions could bias the
results.
To investigate this concern, we split the sample into Type AF and Type F subjects and
separately estimate standard Tobit models in each of the resulting two subsamples. Since
the two estimations are independent of each other, the parameters can freely vary across the
two subsamples.
Table 4 shows the results of the two separate Tobit models. The estimates for the two
types’ inclination to engage in antisocial and free rider punishment remain qualitatively
unchanged compared to their type-specific counterparts from the finite mixture model. The
Type AF subjects’ estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute values than those from the
finite mixture model but remain significant. The type F subjects’ estimates remain almost
unchanged and are highly significant. Not surprisingly, the other parameters, which are
common to both types in the finite mixture model, now vary somewhat between the types.
However, with the exception of the estimates for the influence of the final period and for
the constant, the differences are small. Overall, the results remain robust when we estimate
separate Tobit models in the subsamples of Type AF and Type F subjects. Thus, there is
no evidence that the specification of the finite mixture model is too rigid.
7The parameter estimates of the corresponding finite mixture model can be found in Table A1 in Appendix
A.3. They are virtually identical to the ones of the baseline model in Table 2.
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Table 4: Tobit Models Separately Estimated for Type AF and Type F Subjects
Dependent variable[a]: i’s expenditure to punish j in period t Type AF Type F
Inclination to antisocial punishment (β1k) 0.0615∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
Inclination to free rider punishment −(β1k + β2)[b] 0.146∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗
(0.024)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗
i’s contribution (γ1) -0.222∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(0.028)∗∗∗ (0.147)∗∗∗
Mean contribution of other group members (γ2) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
Received punishment in t− 1 (γ3) 0.272∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.036)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
Period (γ4) -0.176∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗
Final period (γ5) 0.395∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.269)∗∗∗ (0.199)∗∗∗
Constant (β0) -1.210∗∗∗ -2.202∗∗∗
(0.446)∗∗∗ (0.262)∗∗∗
Standard deviation of error term (σ) 4.168∗∗∗ 3.244∗∗∗
(0.226)∗∗∗ (0.160)∗∗∗
Number of subjects 335∗∗∗ 785∗∗∗
Number of observations 10,050∗∗∗ 23,550∗∗∗
Log likelihood -10,819.04∗∗∗ -16,501.59∗∗∗
Individual-specific cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
[a]
Since the dependent variable is non-negative, we use a Tobit specification.
[b]
Estimates and standard errors are based on the Delta-method.
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4.5.3 Type-Membership and Observable Characteristics
Finally, we address the concern that the type-specific heterogeneity may not be latent but
rather a function of the subjects’ observable characteristics. If that were the case, estimating
a finite mixture model would not be necessary and the subjects’ type-membership could be
predicted based on their observable characteristics.
To study this concern, we analyze whether the subjects’ observable characteristics predict
their individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τik. The data contains a number
of individual characteristics, such as gender, age, and socioeconomic variables (see Table S2
in the Supporting Material of Herrmann et al., 2008). Table A2 in Appendix A.4 shows
the results of the corresponding linear probability models. Most observable characteristics
are not significantly correlated with the probability of being a Type AF subject. The only
exceptions are the indicator whether the subject has an urban background, the subject’s
gender, and some indicators for the cultures. Subjects with an urban background are, de-
pending on the specification of the linear probability model, 5.6–6.0 percentage points less
likely to belong to Type AF. Women, on the other hand, are overall 4.4 percentage points
more likely to belong to Type AF. The specification of the linear probability model which
interacts the subjects’ gender with their culture reveals that Protestant and Southern Euro-
pean women drive the overall gender effect. This result is in line with the previous finding
that higher levels of economic development and gender equality favor the manifestation of
gender differences in preferences across countries (Falk and Hermle, 2018). However, overall,
the predictive power of the subjects’ observable characteristics is fairly limited and barely
exceeds 10% of the total variation in the individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership.
Hence, individual type-membership seems to be largely driven by latent heterogeneity and
estimating a finite mixture model is justified.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a parsimonious characterization of the heterogeneity in punishment
behavior by two distinct types of subjects. Overall, there are 35.3% Type AF subjects and
64.7% type F subjects.
Despite its parsimony, our classification of subjects into types gives a possible explanation
for the observed cultural differences in the levels of antisocial punishment and cooperation
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found by previous studies (Brandts et al., 2004; Herrmann et al., 2008; Gächter and Her-
rmann, 2009). In particular, it explains why the intensity of antisocial punishment varies
substantially across cultures while the intensity of free rider punishment is mostly stable.
Moreover, our classification also predicts differences in the effectiveness of peer punish-
ment and has direct policy implications. Managers of multinational firms and policy makers
should take into account that in some cultures peer punishment might not be effective due
to a large share of Type AF subjects who punish prosocial acts and undermine the willing-
ness to contribute to the public good. Hence, depending on the share of Type AF subjects,
in some cultures there may exist a need to rely predominantly on third-party punishment,
whereas in other cultures relying on peer punishment could be more effective.
Relatedly, if the distribution of types across cultures is stable over prolonged time hori-
zons, it may have developmental consequences. Cultures with a high share of Type AF
subjects could benefit less from civic engagement and the spontaneous formation of social
capital. Instead, they may need to rely predominantly on explicit rules and centralized
punishment which are more rigid and arguably more costly to enforce.
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A Appendix
A.1 Model with K = 3 Types
Figure A1: Ambiguous Classification of Subjects into K = 3 Types
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The figure shows the distribution of the individual ex-post probabilities of type-membership τik (see equation
(2)) for the finite mixture model with K = 3 types. Many subjects’ τik are in the middle of the probability
interval, indicating an ambiguous classification. Thus, the the three types exhibit significant overlap which
indicates that the model may overfit the data.
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A.2 How the Number of Type AF Subjects in the Group relates to
Punishment Expenditures and Contributions
Figure A2: Number of Type AF Subjects in the Group and
(a) Mean Expenditures on Punishment
0 1 2 3 4
Number of Type AF Subjects in Group
M
ea
n 
Pu
ni
sh
m
en
t E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 +
/−
 9
5%
 C
I
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
(b) Mean Contributions
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A.3 Model for Testing the Stability of Types
Table A1: Estimates of the Finite Mixture Model for Testing the Stability of Types
Dependent variable[a]: i’s expenditure to punish j in period t Type AF Type F
Type-specific estimates
Share among the population (pik)[b] 0.354∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.027)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗
inclination to antisocial punishment (β1k) 0.136∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
inclination to free rider punishment −(β1k + β2)[c] 0.165∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗
Common estimates
i’s contribution (γ1) -0.196∗∗∗
(0.012)∗∗∗
Mean contribution of other group members (γ2) 0.057∗∗∗
(0.012)∗∗∗
Received punishment in t− 1 (γ3) 0.219∗∗∗
(0.018)∗∗∗
Period (γ4) -0.100∗∗∗
(0.024)∗∗∗
Final period (γ5) 0.572∗∗∗
(0.170)∗∗∗
Constant (β0) -1.960∗∗∗
(0.217)∗∗∗
Standard deviation of error term (σ) 3.594∗∗∗
(0.111)∗∗∗
Number of subjects 1,120∗∗∗
Number of observations 33,600∗∗∗
Log likelihood -28,100.82∗∗∗
AIC 56,223.63∗∗∗
BIC 56,6316.28∗∗∗
Individual-specific cluster robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
[a]
Since the dependent variable is non-negative, we use a Tobit specification.
[b]
There are no significance stars as relative sizes lie within the interval [0, 1].
[c]
Estimates and standard errors are based on the Delta-method.
29
A.4 Type-Membership and Observable Characteristics
Table A2: Linear Probability Model
Dependent variable: Probability of belonging to Type AF (τi,AF ) (1)∗∗∗ (2)∗∗∗
Female 0.044∗∗∗
(0.024)∗∗∗
Female × English speaking -0.002∗∗∗
(0.054)∗∗∗
Female × Protestant European 0.107∗∗∗
(0.047)∗∗∗
Female × Orthodox/Ex-Communist 0.024∗∗∗
(0.057)∗∗∗
Female × Southern European 0.179∗∗∗
(0.073)∗∗∗
Female × Arabic speaking 0.091∗∗∗
(0.120)∗∗∗
Female × Confucian -0.041∗∗∗
(0.049)∗∗∗
Age/100 -0.354∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗
(1.362)∗∗∗ (1.367)∗∗∗
(Age/100)2 0.399∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(2.230)∗∗∗ (2.219)∗∗∗
No. known subjects 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Single Child 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.037)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗
Urban background -0.060∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
Middle class 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.027)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗
Member in civic organization -0.029∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗
English speaking -0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.035)∗∗∗ (0.044)∗∗∗
Orthodox/Ex-Communist 0.174∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.039)∗∗∗ (0.046)∗∗∗
Southern European 0.047∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.042)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗∗
Arabic speaking 0.340∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(0.052)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗
Confucian 0.001∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.034)∗∗∗ (0.046)∗∗∗
Constant 0.361∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.206)∗∗∗ (0.207)∗∗∗
R2 0.098∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
Number of observations / subjects[a] 985∗∗∗ 985∗∗∗
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Protestant European is the basis category.
[a]
135 observations dropped as individual characteristics are not available in all subject pools.
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